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Six Years Later: The Political Landscape in Iraq1   
The Iraq Civil Society Solidarity Initiative conference will be held in March 2008 to facilitate  
the process of  building concrete and meaningful  links of  solidarity  between the global  
movement against the occupation of Iraq and Iraqi civil society through practical projects  
that support the struggle against occupation, dictatorship, and sectarian divisions. 
Achieving the initiative’s  objectives, however,  will  be difficult  without understanding the  
problem and the needs of the Iraqi civil society. This, in turn, requires understanding of the  
complex political environment in which Iraqi civil society organizations and movements op-
erate and the political actors with which they have to interact with in Iraq. 
This research will try to describe the general situation of Iraq, nearly 6 years after the inva-
sion. It will discuss the result of the ’sectarianisation’ of the country, the sectarian war, and 
the strategy initiated at the end of 2006 by the American forces. Then, we will try to ana-
lyse the problem posed by the establishment of a ’failed state’ by the occupation. Third,  
we will explain and analyse the core political issues which are still stacked upon each oth-
er, unresolved and deeply interlocked. Finally, we will give an overview of the main Iraqis 
and internationals actors in Iraq. 
The aftermath of the Chaos:
The ’Sectarianisation‘ of Iraq:
 One can trace the roots of sectarian division in both the long and recent history of 
Iraq  and  in  doing  so  can  find  a  lot  of  factors  and  reasons  behind  it.  It  has  to  be 
emphasized,  however,  that  since  the  Islamic  conquest  of  the  region  more  than  one 
thousands years ago, Iraq has never seen sectarian cleansing or civil war of this present 
scale. How can we explain the implosion of Iraqi society and its descent into the horrors of 
sectarian war? 
Of course, the last thirty years deeply damaged and wounded the Iraqi society. 
First,  decades of Saddam Hussein regime divided the society not only on sectarian or 
tribal  bases. Especially after  the 1991 war  and the crushing of the south  intifada2,  the 
’divide and rule’ tactic of the regime was also using the opposition between the urban area 
and the countryside, and between the classes of the society themselves3. In the meantime, 
Saddam's  regime  organized  the  eradication  of  all  oppositional  parties  and  political 
expressions, even inside the ruling Baath party. Then, and because it was the only space 
1  A Report for the Iraqi Civil Society Initiative, written by Thomas Sommer-Houdeville
2 Insurrection of mostly Shiites population in the south of Iraq after the second gulf war in 1991. See Peter Harling, 
“Saddam Hussein et la débâcle triomphante. Les ressources insoupçonnées de Umm al-Ma‘ârik”, in Hamit 
Bozarslan (dir), l’Irak en perspective, revue des mondes musulmans et de la méditerranée, 2007.
3 Peter Harling, ibid.
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that the regime was not able to control4 or erase completely,  the only alternative voice 
which remained was the religious one.      
Second, the Iraq-Iran war in the eighties ended the era of economic development of Iraq 
and the integration5 of the Iraqi society. The Iranian revolution and the Iraq-Iran war also 
signified the aggravation felt over coercion by the Baath regime and especially against the 
Shia clergy6. 
Third, the society was also greatly wounded by the twelve years of international embargo, 
which cost the lives of more than 500,000 Iraqis. But also, as former UN coordinator for 
the ’Food For Oil’ program Denis Halliday, said in 1999: “The sanctions have bitten deeply 
into  the fabric  of  the Iraqi  society  and norms”  (…)7.  During this  time,  the society  was 
eroding, with the rise of corruption, criminality, prostitution, child labour, illiteracy, and the 
emigration of tens of thousands of people, mainly middle class and highly educated Iraqis8. 
However, the US-led occupation gave the last blows to every single thing which still kept 
the society together. One of these blows, with the destruction of the Iraqi state9, was the 
’sectarianisation’  of  Iraq.  In  fact,  by  trying  to  keep  control  of  the  political  transition  it 
imposed in Iraq, the American occupation introduced an “ethno-sectarian quota sharing 
system”10 inside both the State institutions and the political space since the very beginning. 
One example is the creation at  the end of 2003 of the first  Interim Governing Council 
(IGC),  which  was  supposed  to  be  the  Iraqi  body  preparing  a  real  transition  toward 
sovereignty and advising ministries under the control of the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA)11. The IGC was not based on a political project but on two conditions: the sectarian 
affiliation and the approval of the occupation of Iraq by the US-led coalition. Thus, the old 
Iraqi Communist Party, with a long history of secular ideologies and rhetoric, mixing Sunni, 
Shi’a, Christians and Kurdish militants, suddenly became a Shi’a Party in order to be able 
to enter the ICG. And this trend encouraged by the American administration did not stop 
there.  The CPA distributed  positions  for  the  empty  and destroyed  ministries,  the  new 
Army, and the police by sectarian affiliation of each political group and according to the 
kind  of  alliance  the  US-led  occupation  was  making  with  each  of  these  factions12.  Of 
course, this process was aggravated by all the external powers, including neighbouring 
states which used sectarian division as a tool to intervene through proxies. So in a way, 
each of the several communities which existed in Iraq became a kind of political actor and, 
controlling or representing a community became the way to get money and power inside 
the institutions of the new Iraq. In turn, this transformation pitted one faction against the 
other in a power grab rather than power-sharing climate thus aggravating the sectarian 
4 Nevertheless the regime tried to used to its credit the growing religious feelings within the Iraqi society by lunching 
a governmental religious campaign in 1993 (al hamlah al imaniyyah ).
5 Faleh A.Jabar, The Shi'ite Movement in Iraq, Saqi : London, 2003. 
6 Pierre Jean Luizard, la question irakienne, Paris:Fayards, 2002 and Faleh A. Jabar, op.cit
7 Denis J. Halliday, “The Impact of the UN Sanctions on the People of Iraq”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 28, 
No. 2, (Winter, 1999), pp. 29-37, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2537932 
8 Géraldine Chatelard,  “Iraqi forced migrants in Jordan: Conditions, religious networks, and the smuggling process”, 
UNU-WIDER, Vol 2003/34, Helsinki, 2003. Url : http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/workingpapers/discussion 
papers/2003/en_GB/dp2003-34/_files/78091728636347261/default/dp2003-34.pdf
9 See Chapter two.
10 Reidar Visser “The 22 July Opposition Alliance Is Still Alive and Well – and Gets Some Support from Maliki”, 8 
February 2009, www.historiae.org.
11 The CPA, whose head was L. Paul Bremer, was set up in April 2003 and run Iraq until June 2004.
12 Iyad Allawi : “(...)And their setting of the Iraqi Governing Council along sectarian and ethnic lines also helped 
generate the sectarianism we are still struggling with today(...)” Interview  by InterPressService, January 2008. 
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trend and sentiment of the population. The US-led occupation authority remained as sole 
referee of what became a violent and dangerous encounter especially between the three 
major communities of Iraq: the Arab Shiites, the Arab Sunnis and the Kurds.
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“The Battle of Baghdad’” and ‘the Surge’: 
What happened since 2003 and especially between the end 2005 and the end of 2007 
was a civil war of unprecedented scale in Iraq. This civil war was the result of three factors: 
The ’sectarianisation’ of Iraq and of its institutions, the state of general violence, and the 
destruction of the Iraqi State as described below. If the occupation quickly gave birth to an 
Iraqi guerrilla against it, a real change in the nature of political violence happened after the 
January 2005 elections. Massively boycotted by the Sunni community,  the elections of 
2005 gave birth to a government and related institutions which were under the domination 
of Shiite and Kurdish parties13. From then on, it seemed that the majority of the Shiites and 
Kurds  were  collaborating  with  the  occupation,  while  the  majority  of  the  Sunnis  were 
fighting against it14. Thus, what was seen as a violent encounter between those who fought 
the occupation and those who collaborated was distorted by the confessional prism. At the 
end of 2005, it could be said that Iraq entered a civil war which was waged on three fronts:
_A guerrilla conflict on all  the territory against the occupying forces and the Iraqi State 
seen as a collaborator apparatus (Mostly Guerrilla groups 15 and the Sadrist militia against 
the US troops and some security forces of the Government). 
_A guerrilla  conflict  between Sunni  armed groups and Shiites militias (with  also some 
sectarian elements, mainly Shiite, of the Iraqi security apparatus like the ’Wolf brigade’ or 
the  ’Scorpion  brigade’  of  the  Ministry  of  Interior16) in  the  south  and the  centre  of  the 
country. 
_A guerrilla conflict between Arabs and Kurds in the North around Kirkuk and Mosul. 
The  entire  situation  was  characterized  by  a  multiplication  of  the  main  actors  of  the 
conflict17, mass bomb killings, destructive ’pacification’ campaigns and displacements of 
populations which looked more and more like ethnic or confessional cleansing. 
After the bomb attack of Samara in February 2006 and within the context of social and 
economic chaos in Iraq, militias, armed groups and the guerrilla front were breaking up 
into a multitude of disenfranchised or loosely affiliated sub groups and sub-militia. This 
was true for nearly all militias and armed organisations, like the Sadrist militia (Jeish al 
Madhi),  Sunni  armed  organisations  like  the  Islamic  Army  in  Iraq,  and  Al  Qaeda  in 
13 Mainly the parties following: ISCI, Al Da'wa, PDK, PUK, Al Sadr.  See below, Chapter 4. 
14 Robert Fisk, “Not even Saddam could achieve the divisions this election will bring”, The Independent,22 January 
2005.
15 We think this is important to try to differentiate the different protagonists.  
Guerrilla Group: groups involved in act of guerrilla warfare against the US-led coalition and sometimes against Iraqi 
Government security forces, but without sectarian motivation.  
Militia: Armed branch of a political movement like the Madhi Army (Jeish el Madhi), the militia of the political 
movement led by Moktada Al Sadr. Most of the militia are Shiites or Kurdish and may be considered as sectarian 
militias 
Sunni Armed Group : Armed group from a Sunni background and with sectarian motivation.
But as the country falls into an all out civil war, these differences will be blurred and Iraqi people will mostly use 
the term militia for every groups and actions.  
16 See International press. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4719252.stm and
17 Mainly three different kinds of actors which were 1) militias such as Jeish al Madhi, The Badr Brigades, Sunni 
armed groups like The 1920 Revolution brigade, Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia (AQM), The Islamic Army in Iraq...;2) 
the different Iraqi security apparatus and 3) the US-led coalition troops.
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Mesopotamia  (AQM)18.  This  fragmentation  appears  to  have  followed  a  trend  of 
’territorialisation’. This means that the main actors of the civil war -the militias or armed 
groups- were no longer fighting to inflict a political or military defeat to the enemy, but to 
control  a  territory  which  would  in  turn  provide  the  resources  needed  by  the  militia  to 
survive. Thus, some of these groups or sub-groups were losing their political centre or 
command. In other words,  they were out of control.  From this point of view, cleansing 
areas of the population belonging to another sect and ’filling’ the empty houses with an 
homogeneous population belonging to  the sect  of  the militia  was the principal  way of 
enforcing the control of a neighbourhood19. The testimonies of civilians which were caught 
in the middle of the ‘Battle of Baghdad’20 indicate that it was more of a direct assault by the 
militia against the population to push Sunni or Shiites out of their neighbourhood than a 
fight between the militias themselves21. This sectarian cleansing of many part of Iraq and 
Baghdad has turned many old mixed areas into ’homogeneous’ neighbourhood or towns, 
with two million displaced people inside, and about another two million outside Iraq, all 
unable  to  go  back  home22.  The  effects  of  this  civil  war  on  political,  economic  and 
demographic levels are huge. With tens of thousands dead and the homogenisation of 
entire areas of Iraq23, the fear and the distrust between Shiites, Sunnis, Christians, and 
other sects is high24. This begs the question of how the Iraqi society will be able to find a 
way back to the mixed and multicultural life which was once one of its characteristics.   
Again,  the  American  led  coalition  bears  a  huge  responsibility.  For  years,  the  US-led 
coalition  troops  pitted  the  Iraqi  security  apparatus  against  armed  groups,  but  in  the 
meantime they accepted to be themselves used by factions of the Iraqi security apparatus 
against  other  militias  or  political  parties.  And  instead  of  preventing  the  cleansing  of 
hundreds  of  thousand  of  people,  the  coalition  troops  followed  the  trend  of  the 
homogenisation  by  closing  or  surrounding  entire  neighbourhoods,  like  Al  Adhamya  in 
Baghdad or towns like Falluja or Tel Afar, with walls and concrete. In fact, nothing was 
done to prevent the blood bath. However, in January 2007, President Bush announced a 
change in the American strategy, the so-called ‘Surge’. The ‘Surge’ designed by General 
David Petraeus provided 30,  000 extra American soldiers for  the coalition troops. But, 
above all, the US-led coalition benefited from the context which prevailed since the period 
of the ‘Battle of Baghdad’. 
As stated earlier, the different fronts of the civil war disintegrated between the beginning of 
2006 and the end of 2007. This led to an internal struggle for resources and power inside 
18 Interview with an Iraqi intellectual in Damascus with ties within elements of the resistance. June 2007. See also 
International Crisis Group, Iraq's Civil War, The Sadrists and The Surge, Middle East Report N°72 , February 2008 
and Ashraf al-Khalidi, Victor Tanner, “Sectarian Violence: Radical Groups Drive Internal Displacement in Iraq”, 
An Occasional Paper, The Brookings Institution—University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement, October 
2006.
19 Many testimonies accuse members or groups proclaiming to belong to Jeish al Madhi, The Badr Brigades, AQM 
and the Islamic Army in Iraq, as the main actors of the cleansing. Interviews with Iraqi Refugees in Damascus, Nov 
2006_Dec 2008.
20 Patrick Cockburn, “Battle for Baghdad has already started”, Counterpunch, 25 March 2006, www.counterpunch.org.
21 Interview with Christians, Sunnis and Shiites refugees in Damascus, Nov 2006_Dec 2008.
22 http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=SUBSITES&id=470387fc2
23 See for example Maps of Baghdad showing the result of the sectarian cleansing. GRAPHIC: Gene Thorp and Dita 
Smith - The Washington Post - December 15, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/graphic/2007/12/16/GR2007121600060.html  and BBC NEWS“Iraq: Four years on , Mapping the 
violence”,  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/in_depth/baghdad_navigator/
24 Thomas Sommer-Houdeville, “Discours et représentations des Réfugiés Irakiens en Syrie :quelques éléments 
d’analyses” In "Territoires de pouvoirs et espaces de croyances au Machrek", A contrario, N°11, Mars  2009, 
www.unil.ch/acontrario et www.cairn.info. 
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the Sunni camp in the centre of the country,  especially in the governorate of Al Anbar. 
There,  as  early  as  2006,  the  loose coalition  between  AQM,  the  various  Sunni  armed 
groups and the local tribes began to gradually fragment25. The ultra-violent behaviour of 
AQM, but most of all,  its attempt to supplant tribal prerogatives and impose its Islamic 
Emirate  in  Al  Anbar  in  October  2006,  infuriated  all  the  other  Sunni  actors26.  In  the 
meantime, since Sunni armed groups as well as AQM were deeply linked to the Sunni 
tribes, the internal fights between Sunni armed groups and AQM were threatening to turn 
into tribal wars27. Moreover, the Sunni armed groups were losing the wars that most of 
them  were  waging  on  two  fronts;  one  against  the  foreign  forces  and  the  new  Iraqi 
government and one against Shiite militias for the control  of Baghdad and some other 
areas. Within one year, all of this produced a complete reversal in the situation. Before the 
surge, the Sunni armed groups and AQM were leading the struggle against the American 
troops,  the  Iraqi  government  and  the  Shiite  militias.  In  that  battle,  Sunni  tribes were 
providing assistance, fighters and even making a pledge to the Sunni armed groups or 
AQM.  But,  in  2007  the  tribes  increasingly  emerged  as  the  leadership  of  a  campaign 
directed mainly against Al Qaeda, though still also against Shiite militias (considered as 
proxies of Iran). In this new configuration, the Sunni armed groups28 had a secondary role 
and  the  US  forces  were  then  considered  as  a  subsidiary  target.  The  American 
administration saw the opportunity to make an alliance with this movement of tribal revival 
and to bolster it in order to boost its fight against the AQM. Consequently, at the beginning 
of 2007, the Sahwa (the Awakening Movement) was officially created under the patronage 
of a disenfranchised sheikh population and the US Army29.  In this movement,  sheikhs 
willing to fight and provide fighters against Al Qaeda would be armed and well paid by the 
US Army30. One year later, the Sahwa also called ’the sons of Iraq’ was widely expanded 
beyond the al Anbar governorate and gathered more than 90, 000 fighters. Even better for 
the US administration, as the Sahwa was growing faster and stronger everyday, the major 
part of the Sunni armed groups were either forced to stop their operations and remain in 
the  shadows,  or  to  enlist  in  the  Sahwa.  Still,  some  Sunni  armed  groups  remained 
somehow active but at a lesser extent than previously. 
25 Association of Muslim Scholars “We Are Now Waging Two Battles: Against 'the Occupation' and Against 'the 
Terrorists'”, Al-Hayat, January 26, 2006. (The first real fights between some tribal groups and Al Qaeda in 
Mesopotamia occurred in Ramadi and then expand gradually to all al anbar and the rest of Iraq.)
26 Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, even if it was able to recruit Iraqis and benefits from the help of tribes and part of the 
population, was always seen as a foreign organization.
27  John A. McCary, “The Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives”, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, The Washington Quaterly, January 2009.
28 Even if some tried to resist the growing power of the tribes. See International Crisis Group,  “Iraq After The Surge 
I : The new Sunni Landscape”, Middle East Report N°74 – 30 April 2008
29 “He was a well known thief. In Al Anbar everybody called him and his tribes, the ali baba of the road , because they  
were making their money in attacking the trucks and holding to ransom everybody on the road to Amman(…)”, 
Interview with Iraqis from Al Anbar. Damascus 2007-2008.
30 Every fighter is paid around 300 dollars/months for a total budget of more than 300 millions of Dollars a year. Then 
each Sheikh will get 20% of the total wages of his fighters and sometimes weapons and cars. See Special Inspector 
General for Iraqi Reconstruction (SIGIR), Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report, July 30, 2008, page 94. http://
www.sigir.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/default.aspx, ; International Crisis Group, art.cit, Middle East Report N°74 – 
30 April 2008; and International Press 2007_2008.
8
This reshuffle of the Sunni landscape had a real military and political impact. In the first 
place, the number of operations against US troops and the Iraqi government dramatically 
diminished31. Then, the newly empowered sheikhs of the Sahwa sought to transform their 
fighting power and their alliance with the American administration into political power. They 
did so by running against the old Sunni Iraqi Islamist Party in the provincial elections in 
2009.  Still,  there  remain  some  questions  about  the  future  of  this  movement  and  its 
involvement either in the stabilization of Iraq or in the disintegration of the country. How 
long will the former armed groups, which enlisted in the Sahwa, accept the patronage of 
the  tribal  Sheikhs32?  How will  these  thousands  of  Sunni  fighters,  loyal  to  a  dozen  of 
sheikhs,  be integrated in  Iraqi  Security Forces which  are infiltrated by sectarian Shiite 
militias?  And  how  will  these  fighters  obey  a  government  which  most  of  them  were 
denouncing as illegitimate? If it agreed to take the financial charge of the Sahwa for one 
more  year,  the  Shia/Kurds-led  government  was  very  reluctant  to  absorb  them  in  the 
security apparatus and promised to integrate only 20% of them. So what will the remaining 
80 percent do?33
31 See SIGIR, “Quarterly Report and SemiAnnual Report to the United States Congress”, January 2009. 
32 “At one side the sheikhs are concerned about how to maximize and preserve the political and economical power 
they just acquired, while at the other side, political and military actors of the armed groups may want to resume the 
fight against the occupation and the government. When this will happened 'Sahwa' will explode completely and it  
will be bloody”. Interview Iraqi refugee with tie to the resistance. Damascus Dec 2008. 
33 Ned Parker, Tina Susman, “Iraq's Sunni fighters leave U.S. Payroll”, LA Times,November 11, 2008.
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A state of general violence:
Iraq  can  still  be  defined  as  a  state  of  general  violence,  where  criminal,  economic, 
sectarian, political and military violence are effective every day and night, everywhere in 
Iraq. In the last few years, Iraqi society seems to have been absorbed by a centrifugal 
system whose  centre  is  violence.  Violence can be defined as:  “(...)  every  physical  or  
psychological infliction which may lead to terror, displacement, misery, suffering, or the  
death of a living being; all act of intrusion which is voluntary or involuntary leading to the  
dispossession of someone, to the damaging or the destruction of non living objects34”. This 
Centrifugal System is leading to simultaneous forms of violence. As Hamit Bozarslan put it: 
“the Iraqi situation illustrates how a conflictual process can lead to a plurality of forms of  
violence. 35”  and  :  “  (...)  because  it  [the  violence]  is  at  the  same  time  “militant”,  
communitarian, and more and more “biological”, as the different actors consider their very  
existence as a threat to each other(...)36 ”.
In fact, one can briefly note at least five types of violence taking place in Iraq:  
_A Mafia-like violence which spreads to  all  parts  of  the country and against  all  social 
classes. This is directly related to the destruction of the Iraqi State which followed the 
invasion by the ’coalition forces’.  
 
_An insurgency or counter-insurgency violence operated by guerrilla groups and militias or 
the ’coalition forces‘ and the government.
_A  political  violence  engaged  by  and  against  political  parties,  or  against  individuals 
because of their opinions or political affiliations. 
_A territorial cross-sectarian violence. The aim is the eviction of members of a community 
considered as ’the enemy’ from a specific territory, or to conquer a territory inhabited by a 
community considered as the enemy. This is the case in a lot of clashes which opposed 
Sunnis and Shiites, but against Christian, Mandean or Yazidi communities as well. Mostly, 
the actors of this type of violence are the sectarian militias or sectarian elements inside the 
security apparatus of the new State.  
 _An intra-territorial violence. The aim is to achieve the leadership and/or the control of a 
territory. It can involve guerrilla groups, militias or political parties (for example, between 
the Madhi army and the Badr militia in Basra or Peshmergas and ’Sons of Iraq’ in the 
governorate  of  Ninewa).  But  it  can  also  be  waged  precisely  against  specific  targets 
because of their professions (DVD sellers or barbers...) or opinions.     
Of course, these forms of violence are ebbing and flowing, and are taking place at different 
times and in different places. But also with different forms and affecting different victims 
according to whether it is against all the Iraqi population without discrimination or on the 
contrary when it focuses on specific individuals or community. Syria and Jordan as well as 
other  nearby  countries,  are  now flooded  with  hundred  of  thousands  of  refugees,  the 
majority of whom fled this violence. There, one may find thousands of their testimonies. 
34 Françoise Héritier, « Réflexions pour nourrir la réflexion », in F. Héritier (dir.), De La Violence 1, Paris : Odile 
Jacob, 2005, p.17.
35 Hamit Bozarslan,, op.cit., p. 224.
36 Ibid
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For example, some refugees who are living now in Yarmouk, a suburb of Damascus, fled 
their city of Fallujah during its destruction by the American forces in 2004. Others fled from 
Baghdad later, in 2006, when they where driven out of their houses in Khazamia37 by 
Shiite militias, because they were Sunnis or Christians. Others fled from Basra in early 
2004, because they were professors and targeted by gangsters, etc... Moreover, in some 
cases, these different types of violence tend to intermingle38. And in a context of a failed 
state, social chaos and military occupation, the political field turns out to be quickly and 
easily  replaced  by  the  military  field  as  each  actor  begins  to  rely  more  and  more  on 
weapons and violence to achieve political gain and influence. 
Despite this, there appears to have been a reduction in violence in Iraq since the end of 
2007.  The figures  of  Iraqi  civilian  victims  reported by the US Army as  well  as  others 
studies  from  Brookings,  SIGIR,  or  UN,  testify  to  this39.  It  is  too  early  now  to  fully 
understand if it is just a break in the all-out violence which was the characteristic of the 
conflict  in  Iraq  or  a  real  evolution.  But  a  reduction  in  violence  does  not  mean  the 
suppression of  violence40.  At  best,  what  we see now is  the vanishing,  momentarily  or 
definitively, of extreme forms of violence, especially sectarian cleansing, which has already 
achieved most of its aims, thus validating this reduction.41 Nevertheless, ongoing general 
violence is seriously undermining the possibility of a political settlement of the Iraqi crisis. 
There are paths to  follow in order to  reduce the violence and even to  get out  of  this 
centrifugal system of violence. But two steps appear vital. One is the inclusion of all actors 
in a political National Reconciliation process. The other is the rebuilding of a non sectarian 
and non partisan State which  will  be able  to provide the security and all  the services 
needed for the Iraqi Society to get  an adequate “(...)sense of group inclusion, trust and 
ontological security(...)”42.
37 Interviews of Iraqi refugees Nov 2006_December 2008.
38 For example, there are numerous cases of people being kidnapped by gang, then sold to a militia which used it for 
political aims.
39 Lins de Albuquerque (Adriana), O’Hanlon (Michael E.), “ Iraq index, Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and 
Security in post Saddam Iraq”, The Brookings Institution, Washington, July 2008, www.brookings.edu/iraqindex, 
p12; Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction (SIGIR), “Quarterly Report and SemiAnnual Report to the 
United States Congress”, January 2009.
40 See the weekly reports of political violence in Iraq of Mcclatchy: http://www.mcclatchydc.com and Reuters, 
http://www.reuters.com.
41 See for example Maps of Baghdad showing the result of the sectarian cleansing. GRAPHIC: Gene Thorp and Dita 
Smith - The Washington Post - December 15, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/graphic/2007/12/16/GR2007121600060.html  and BBC NEWS“Iraq: Four years on , Mapping the 
violence”,  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/in_depth/baghdad_navigator/ 
42 Anthony H. Richmond, “sociological theories of international migration : the case of refugees”, International 
Sociological Association, 1988. In this article, Richmond  Richmond speaks about the development of a refugee 
crisis.
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2) The new Iraqi State, a failed State:
The ’Tabula Rasa formula’:
The American adventure in Iraq began by a military operation with an evocative name: 
‘The Shock and Awe’. First, US troops dropped no less than 29 900 tons of bombs and 
other military software all  over Iraq43 and destroyed not only military sites but also civil 
infrastructures like universities, telecommunication centres... Then, columns of American 
soldiers travelled to  Baghdad without  showing mercy to  anyone,  soldiers and civilians 
alike, who would have dared to stand in their way44. In 42 days of combat operations45, the 
most conservative studies estimate the number of Iraqis killed between 15 000 and 45 
000, and at least half of them were civilians45. As Baghdad fell on April 8th, the Iraqi capital 
and also Mosul, Samawa, Basra and other cities were burned and looted for more than 
three weeks46. Everything was ransacked, from the hospitals, the sewage water plants and 
the ministries to the schools and the museums. As retired General Jay Garner put it: “They 
not only took everything out of there, but they stripped the electrical wires out of the wall,  
and they stripped most of the plumbing out and then they set the buildings on fire47”. Then, 
the three main Iraqi banks were robbed by a Mafia-like mob, and millions of dollars in cash 
disappeared.  People  were  then  attacked in  the  street  and so  began to  try  to  protect 
themselves. All of this, without a single intervention from the coalition forces to prevent it48. 
Indeed,  for  lots  of  people,  the  destruction  of  prisons  or  police  stations  or  other 
governmental offices were a form of revenge against the era of fear and injustice of the 
Saddam regime49. But these destructions and lootings of the capital were so dreadful that 
many Iraqis will remember them as equally outrageous as the destruction of the city by the 
Mongols in 1258 AD. A few months later, speaking of the events of April 2003 in Baghdad, 
an Iraqi translator told us: “try to imagine what you would feel if Paris was burning, if the  
Louvre  was  burning,  and  the  Sorbonne  University  and  all  your  hospitals...it  is  what  
happened here50”. What is certain is that the infrastructure of the Iraqi State was badly hit 
twice  -  once  by  the  war  itself  and  then  by  the  weeks  of  lootings  which  followed  the 
invasion. No comprehensive estimates were made, but the SIGIR reports billions of dollars 
of  damage51.  Moreover,  as  the  first  hospital  began  to  be  looted,  the  rule  of  law 
disappeared as well as the feeling of security.
Then, on May 16th 2003, while burned ministries were still smoking and chaos in the street 
was  still  rampant,  the  head  of  CPA,  Paul  L.Bremer  issued  his  first  orders,  the  ‘De-
Baathification of the Iraqi Society’ and ‘the regulation of entities [Disbanding of the army 
43 Project on Defense Alternatives of the Commonwealth Insitute, www.comw.org
44 Reporters sans frontières, La guerre en Irak, le livre noir, la Découverte, Paris 2004, p49
45  Between the official beginning of the war, the 20 of March 2003 and the official end of the war the first of May 
2003.
4 5 As the coalition forces refused to count the Iraqi dead, we have to rely on ONG like IraqBodyCount 
(Www.iraqibodycount.net ) or the studies from publication like the Lancet or studies from  O.R.B. 
(www.opinion.co.uk) and IIACSS (www.iiacss.org).
46 See the International press of the month of April 2003. BBC NEWS, Le Monde, 12 April 2003... 
47 Quoted in SIGIR “Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience”, February 2009. 
48 Except for the oil ministry which was well guarded by American Tanks and Humvee.
49 “Going in the street, or entering and opening the prisons was like taking back our dignity(...)Then some people 
began to burn the interior ministry, as if we were burning Saddam himself(...)”  Interviews with refugees in 
Damascus Nov 2006_Dec2008 
50 Interview, Baghdad December 2003.
51 SIGIR, “Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience”, February 2009.
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and all the Iraqi security forces]52’. Nobody would dispute the fact that the former regime 
and the Baath party have to answer for the last three decades of terror in Iraq and their 
executioners have to be prosecuted. But, the ’De-Baathification’ and the disbanding of the 
army programs were led on a very ideological stance without taking a single minute either 
to consider the chain of command inside the State Party and the different levels of guilt of 
the millions of members, or to consider the chance of a reconciliation process. In one day, 
more than 400,  000 soldiers and officers were  fired without  compensation,  as well  as 
thousands of civil servants, teachers, professors, doctors...As Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez 
wrote: “Essentially, it eliminated the entire government and civic capacity of the nation.  
Organizations involving justice, defence, interior, communications, schools,  universities,  
and hospitals were all either completely shut down or severely crippled, because anybody  
with any experience was now out of a job.53”So, in one day and with just a signature, 
Bremer gave the last blow to what remained of the Iraqi State.  And worse still, it may have 
sent the first signal of the ’sectarianisation’ of Iraq. As Hazem Saghieh explained: “Sunni  
circles  viewed  the  De-Baathification  'as  the  eradication  of  Sunni  influence  from  the  
ministries and all the country's vital institutions54.” 
Last but not least, the American occupation decided to change the Iraqi state-dominated 
economy to: “(…) a sustainable market-driven economic system” (…)55. The economy was 
opened  to  the  most  fundamentalist  forms  of  capitalism  and  ’laissez-faire’  system.  As 
Naomi Klein retraced it56, Paul Bremer issued an unprecedented set of laws which were in 
complete contradiction with  all  the international  law applicable to  occupied territories57. 
Iraqi Borders were completely opened to any kind of imports, without taxes or inspections, 
the corporate tax rate went  from 40 to 15%, and more importantly,  foreign companies 
would be able to own 100% of Iraqi assets without having to invest even 1% of the benefits 
in Iraq. Privatization was proposed for nearly two hundred State-Owned Companies (SOC/
SOE)  and  their  hundreds  of  factories  producing  olive  oil,  soap,  food  and  agricultural 
products, or clothes, concrete or washing-machines. Unfortunately, the privatization plan 
did not go smoothly because of the lack of foreign investors, who were frightened by the 
quagmire that Iraq soon became. So, instead of privatizing the Iraqi State industry,  the 
American administration left all state factories half working, idle or dying, and cancelled all 
their bank accounts and prevented them from receiving any support or help. But before the 
war they were employing 500, 000 people and accounted for “90 percent of the country's 
industrial capacity58”.
Thus, a few months after the invasion, the Iraqis woke up to a country without operative 
schools, hospitals, electricity or water system, police or ministries, but with chaos in the 
street and millions of unemployed people.
52 CPA Regulation Number 1 & 2, “The Coalition Provisional Authority,” May 16, 2003.
53 Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story, New York: HarperCollins, 2008, p184.
54 Hazem Saghieh, “The life and death of the De-Baathification”, in Hamit Bozarslan (dir.), l’Irak en perspective,  
Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée, No 117-118, Aix en Provence : Edisud, 2007.
55 http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/economic_rfp_iraq_public.pdf.
56 Naomi Klein, “Baghdad Year Zero - Part I&II: Pillaging Iraq in pursuit of a neocon utopia", Harper's Magazine, 
September 2004.
57 Hague Convention (IV), sections III, articles 43,48, 53, 55.
58 SIGIR, “Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience”, February 2009.
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Can't Provide Anything.:
’Can't  Provide  Anything’,  was  the  ironic  nickname  gave  to  the  Coalition  Provisional 
Authority  by  Iraqis  and  Americans  soldiers  alike  during  the  time  it  was  ruling  Iraq. 
Unfortunately this nickname could also be attributed to the Iraqi Government which was 
born after the general elections of January 2005. In fact, after having completely destroyed 
the structures of the Iraqi State, with the notable exception of the oil sector, the American 
administration  failed  to  restore  and  rebuild  a  State  in  Iraq59.  Because  of  complete 
inefficiency and huge corruption, neither the CPA nor the New Iraqi government achieved 
very  much60.  Despite  its  rather  soft  language,  claims  made  in  SIGIR  reports  are 
noteworthy.  It  shows that  in 14 months the CPA would have “lost  track” of  nearly 8.8 
billions dollars61.  Besides, the CPA and all its agencies as well as the contractors staff 
were filled with inadequate or unqualified personnel, and the turnover in the CPA was so 
high that: “when the CPA dissolved on June 28, 2004, there were only seven people on  
the staff who had served for the CPA’s fourteen-month duration”62. Of course, inefficiency 
and corruption did not stop with the CPA dissolution. As said earlier, new institutions of the 
Iraqi  State  and  the  Iraqi  government  itself  were  built  with  the  notion  of  preserving  a 
sectarian  and  an  ethnic  vision  of  Iraq.  And  because  the  ’Debaathification’  virtually 
discarded tens of thousands of experienced civil servants, ministries and state institutions 
had  to  be  filled  again.  Ministerial  positions  began  to  be  the  prize  of  a  huge  bargain 
between political parties allegedly representing sects and communities among the Iraqi 
people. As different parties’  strongholds began to appear in each ministry and in each 
branch of ministries, the recruitment of the staff was managed in regard to sectarian and 
partisan affiliation, but not to the qualification or the experience63. Thus, from the bottom to 
the top, the Iraqi State was ’sectarianised’ and most of its staff inefficient. Therefore, the 
partisan and sectarian competition between ministries and institutions made the necessary 
coordination quite impossible. Elections of January 2005 led to a shift in part of the staff 
and parties stronghold in the ministries, but nepotism and corruption remained unchanged. 
As a very good example which can be applied to all ministries, Andrew Rathmell’s report 
about the reconstruction of the Interior Ministry underlines the dire and continuous struggle 
between Al Da'wa party, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, the Iraqi National Accord, 
the Sadrist and the Kurds to control the ministry and filling all the different services and 
agency with their supporters and even militias64.   
The devolution of powers and missions to the governorates and local councils to follow the 
radical  federalization  of  the  State  further  aggravated this  disarray.  Either  because the 
governorates did not receive the necessary budget to accomplish their mission or because 
59 See Ferguson Charles, No end in sight, Documentary Movie, Magnolia productions, 2007. 
60 Since 2007, Iraq is ranked 178 on 180 surveyed countries by the Transparency International Annual CPI reports. 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi
61   SIGIR, “Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience”, February 2009.
62 SIGIR, ibid.
63 ICG Middle East Report N°27, “Iraq's Transition: On a Knife Edge”, 27 April 2004.
64 (...)it was restructured with the explicit purpose of reflecting and accommodating the political power balance of  
post-Saddam Iraq. At the time, there were only three state security agencies. The nascent Iraqi army and civil  
defence corps were run by the Coalition. The nascent Iraqi National Intelligence Service was run by the CIA. This  
left the MOI [ministry of interior] and its subordinate entities as the only central security apparatus over which 
Iraqi politicians could exercise influence and through which they could deploy state-sanctioned coercion. (...) the 
structure was designed to give the key power-brokers. (...) This meant that each could use their parts of the ministry 
to build up patronage networks and paramilitary and intelligence capabilities through official channels.(...),” 
Andrew Rathmell, “fixing Iraq's Internal Security Forces, why is reform of Ministry of Interior so hard ?”, Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, November 2007. 
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local heads of governorate opposed national policies, lots of reconstruction projects were 
unfinished or left idle or not even started. Trying to reshape the state in the context of 
occupation  and  internal  war,  the  occupational  authority  and  the  Iraqi  political  actors 
involved, gave birth to a shapeless state. 
By 2009, nearly $125 billion (more than half of it from Iraqi public funds) will have been 
committed for  the  reconstruction of  Iraq.  So far,  all  the goals  and benchmarks of  the 
reconstruction are far from being achieved65. One example among others, six years and 
nearly $5 billion later, the daily electricity production is only slightly greater than the pre-
war production when Iraq was under international embargo66. And there is still less than 6 
hours of electricity a day in Iraq. It is also notable that since 2003 the price of domestic fuel 
has multiplied by 3567, or that the average inflation rate since 2003 was around 50% to 
60% a year  until  it  began to stabilize in 2007. Also, six years later,  60 % of the Iraqi 
population is still consuming the monthly food rations of the World Food Program which 
was  supposed  to  end  in  June  2004.  And  25% (nearly  6.5  million  people)  are  highly 
dependent on this program set up by the UN, during the infamous years of international 
sanctions  following  the first  Gulf  war.  Moreover, only  40% of  the  Iraqi  population  has 
access to drinking water68. As a consequence, there were numerous outbreaks of cholera 
from 2006 to 200869. Last but not least, the policy concerning the State-Owned Companies 
did not really change, even if some were granted some budget to start their operations 
again. But most of them are still kept idle or with a minimum of outputs70. Developing a 
dynamic policy toward the State Owned Companies would have helped to “ (...) support  
the [reconstruction] work in the electrical,  oil,  health,  water and sewage, and transport  
sectors(...),  it  would  have  revitalized  Iraq”70 Instead,  the  unemployment  rate  is  still 
estimated around 60%71 and the  Iraqi market is now flooded with foreign products, from 
everywhere  in  the  world  at  exorbitant  prices,  and with  Halliburton  and Bechtel  selling 
concrete for $1000 a ton and making millions in profit.
Today, the Iraqi state is still  poisoned with corruption and nepotism. And despite slight 
improvements it is far from providing the basic services and resources, or the structures of 
these services, which are the marks of a modern state, i.e. health, education, transport, 
energy,  in  addition  to  security.  Of  course,  this  incapacity  has  considerable  effects, 
emphasizing the terrible economic and social crisis which affects Iraq now. But it has also 
sociological side effects, which could be described as ’disaffiliation’ with the state and the 
nation. This underlines the trend to rely more on sectarian or community -mainly tribal- 
affiliations to get resources and security.
65 It should be noted however that in February 2009 in a survey conducted for BBC, ABC News and NHK Iraqis 
interviewed claimed an overall improvement in some services, including water and electricity, since 2007. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/13_03_09_iraqpollfeb2009.pdf
66 4,077 Megawatts in 2002,  4,997 in 2009. See SIGIR, “Quarterly Report and SemiAnnual Report to the United 
States Congress”, January 2009.  
67  Lins de Albuquerque (Adriana), O’Hanlon (Michael E.), op.cit.
68  International Compact with Iraq,“A New Beginning: Annual Review,” May 2007-April 2008. 
http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/10/36/08/dfdaeead.pdf 
69  ICRC, “ Iraq : No Let-Up in, The Humanitarian Crisis”, March 2008.
70 And the Iraqi government is still thinking about the total privatization of this companies: “I think it is very easy for  
the industrial sector to privatize. We can privatize it, and it would be successful and profitable. No need at all for  
government to intervene in those sectors. The government can be a partner [in other areas of the economy] and  
some services could be mixed, like education and health(...).”Interview of Ali Baban, Iraqi Minister of Planning, in 
SIGIR, “Quarterly Report and SemiAnnual Report to the United States Congress”, January 2009, p10.
7 0 Interview of Dr. Sami Al-Araji in SIGIR, “Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience”, February,2009
71  Lins de Albuquerque (Adriana), O’Hanlon (Michael E.), op.cit., Brooking Institute, December 2008.
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Monopolizing the Violence? 
Reading Max Weber, one understands that a State is an enterprise seeking to monopolize 
the legitimate use of violence in a given territory. In his theory, domination or monopoly of 
violence and legitimacy are deeply linked. Domination and legitimacy provide in return the 
security and the framework in which the society can move and political competition can 
happen. 
Looking  at  the  Iraqi  situation,  one  can  argue  that  the  new  Iraqi  State  has  neither 
domination nor legitimacy. In the context of general violence, the arms of the State, the 
Iraqi police and the Iraqi army, were both instrumentalised by many forces,72 including the 
US-led occupation authority. Consequently, they were far from succeeding in imposing a 
break in  the  general  violence and providing  security  for  the  people.  In  fact,  by many 
aspects they were73, and, in a lesser measure are still, responsible of the general violence. 
As far as legitimacy is concerned, the new Iraqi state and its government ruled by Maliki 
did not enjoy much of it. It was seen first as a creation of the foreign occupying power. 
Then, after the elections of 2005, where a slight majority of the Iraqi people participated74, 
many  were  disillusioned by  the  way  the  elected  parties  managed  the  State  and  the 
governorates75. In fact, Iraqi institutions appear more as a tool which provides resources 
and power in the military and political struggles than anything else. Finally, the government 
of  Iraq  was  seen as  an  actor  in  the  conflict  like  the  others,  without  the  legitimacy to 
negotiate or the domination to impose a settlement of the crisis. 
True, for few months, it seems that the situation has been changing. As stated earlier, 
violence  diminished,  and  the  number  of  civilian  victims  of  the  violence  has  been 
diminishing. In the meantime, the number of the actors in the civil  war seems to have 
reduced. On one side, the Sunni armed groups were either incorporated in the  Sahwa 
movement or weakened and al Qaeda was substantially beaten. Indeed, the future of the 
relation  between  the  Maliki  government  and  the  Sahwa movement  and its  integration 
within the Iraqi Security Forces are still precarious. But until now this movement is acting 
like an official security force of Iraq. On the other side, a big part of Jeish al Madhi, or sub-
militia associates to it, has been either disbanded by the al Sadr Movement (following the 
official truce declared by Moktada al Sadr in March 2008) or crushed in 2008 by the Iraqi 
government with  the help of  the American forces in Baghdad and in the South of  the 
country76. From the point of view of the reconstruction of the Iraqi state, this new tendency 
on the ground, the diminishing violence and the reduction of its actors, may facilitate the 
quest for the monopoly of violence and perhaps help create a security framework within 
the society. Of course, among the many obstacles which remain, one is the partisan and 
sectarian colour of the institutions of the Iraqi state and especially its security apparatus. 
As already mentioned, the Iraqi security forces are still seen, and for good reason, as a 
tool  in  the hand of  partisan  and sectarian  forces.  Needless  to  say,  this  is  completely 
undermining any legitimacy of the State. Furthermore, the political process engaged by the 
American-led  occupation  is  still  lacking  legitimacy  for  some  actors.  Thus,  and  also 
72 Among others, by the Badr militia of the ISCI, Al Da'wa party, al Sadr militia in some governorates, the Kurdish 
parties.
73 There is numerous report of the existence of death squad, shadow units among the security apparatus of the State. 
See International Press and Robert Fisk and Darh Jamail reports.
74 Around 58% (with the notable exception of the Sunni Arabs and some segments of the rest of Iraqi population). See 
Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, http://www.ieciraq.org.
75 International Crisis Group,“Iraq’s Provincial Elections: The Stakes”, Middle East Report N°82, 27 January 2009. 
76 But the Badr brigade as well as the “Peshmergas” remain.
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because of their inefficiencies, all  the institutions and the Iraqi government which were 
established from this political process are still suffering the same condition. The quest for 
legitimacy is still a long way to go.           
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3) Core issues:
Since  the  beginning  of  the  American-led  occupation,  the  international  media  mostly 
focused on the occupation, the civil war between Iraqis, and the human cost of these six 
disastrous years. But even if they are worth knowing, these facts and figures do not help 
us understand what remains behind the scene of the sectarian war and the occupation and 
which are in the end the core issues of the political argument between the different actors 
of this conflict and which will determine the future of the country. Ultimately, we see five 
decisive questions arising from concerns relating to democracy,  rights and freedoms77, 
which represent still unresolved issues and stack one upon the other. As the International 
Crisis Group put it,  the main problem is that:  “The interlocking nature of  these issues 
means they cannot be solved individually or sequentially”78. 
The withdrawal of foreign forces and the recovery of total sovereignty: 
First of all, the United States waged an illegal and illegitimate war against Iraq79. Thus, in 
spite  of  the  UN  resolution,  and  now  the  Security  Agreement  signed  with  the  Iraqi 
Government, the US presence in Iraq remains illegitimate and illegal. Furthermore, the US 
failed to prevent Iraq from falling into economic and social chaos. On the contrary, with its 
sectarian and ethnic-oriented policy, the US-led occupation prepared the ground for the 
sectarian civil war. Today, its presence can still fuel new conflicts in Iraq. Furthermore, its 
presence is still preventing the inclusion of many political actors in the political process like 
Hayat al Ulema or the Iraqi National Foundation Congress80. Also, it is still undermining the 
legitimacy of the Iraqi Government. From this point of view, the Security Agreement (ex 
SOFA) and the Security Framework Agreement which were signed at the end of last year 
are ambiguous steps in the direction of a withdrawal and the return of the sovereignty of 
Iraq. Most US forces should have gone by 2011. But the SA is not clear at all about the 
military bases which were built by the US military in Iraq since 2003. Also, it still gives the 
opportunity for the next Iraqi government to keep US military forces in Iraq beyond 2011, 
with fifty thousand troops likely to remain post-withdrawal. Concerning the conduct and the 
legal immunity of such foreign forces on Iraqi soil, it is worth noting that the SA has already 
been violated at least twice by the US forces, since it was signed in December 200881. 
Also,  the continuing presence of  the notorious and unpopular  Private  Military  Security 
Companies who are accused of war crimes against innocent civilians, has yet to be fully 
addressed by the new US Administration.  Moreover,  the US presence,  because of its 
international policy, especially in the region, is and will keep luring other regional powers, 
like Iran or Saudi Arabia, into a war of influence inside Iraq. This war of influence and 
proxies  inside  Iraq  is  definitely  spoiling  the  possibility  of  a  political  settlement  of  the 
conflict. 
77 For example, the place of the religion inside the constitution, the place of women inside the Iraqi society, etc... 
78 International Crisis Group, “Iraq After The Surge II:The Need For A New Political Strategy”, Middle East Report 
n°75, April 2008.
79 Ewen MacAskill, Julian Borger, “Iraq war was illegal and breached UN charter, says Annan “, Guardian.co.uk, 
Thursday 16 September 2004.
80 See below Chapter 4 on political actors.
81 ALISSA J. RUBIN, “U.S. Military Violated Security Agreement Twice in 2 Weeks, Iraqi Leaders Say”, NY Times, 
February 6, 2009. 
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The Federalism issue and the rebuilding of the State:
The question of federalism is still undermining the stability of Iraq. 
The problem is not federalism in itself, but the context in which it is implemented. First, it is 
still seen by a majority of Iraqis as an imported and unwanted political solution82. Second, it 
is seen by lot of political actors, but also a vast part of the Iraqi population as a tool to 
weaken the state and maybe to provide a legal way to split the country83, at the very same 
time when the rebuilding of the Iraqi state is still not accomplished. Above all, the question 
of division of resources between the federal state and the regions or governorates has 
fuelled the fear of unequal development between the areas which have oil and those which 
don’t. Also, interpretation of the law relating to decision making between all the different 
levels of the federal government, the governorates, and the provincial councils is still  a 
source of confusion and heated debate. There is a real need for clarifying the different 
missions, fields and areas of competence of each level of the federal institutions. 
Finally, the possibility engendered by the current Iraqi federalist system to create super-
regions may reinforce the sectarian trend and the instability of Iraq. In this context, the 
main problem is not the existence of the Kurdistan region which has been an entity  de 
facto since the 1991 war. Due to the historical and national struggle of the Kurdish people, 
it is mainly accepted by the Iraqi political actors. But the projects84 led by the ISCI and 
other Shiia political actors for the creation of a super region including nine governorates (or 
maybe eleven, including Baghdad85) is a direct projection of a sectarian vision of Iraq. With 
a mostly Shiite Southern region86, a Kurdish region (containing three governorates, but still 
trying  to  incorporate  surrounding  territories87)  in  the  North,  the  only  solution  for  the 
remaining governorates will  be to gather in a third super region which will  be seen as 
mainly Sunni. Consequently, many think that this will inevitably lead to the partition of Iraq 
on sectarian lines.         
   
The hydrocarbons resources:  
The question of the management and distribution of the hydrocarbon resources remain 
unresolved and highly controversial.
Historically,  and especially following the period of decolonisation, the question is highly 
symbolic, but also vital for the economy of Iraq. Around 90% of the Iraqi national budget 
comes from the revenue of oil88.  Until  now, the Council of Representatives have failed 
even to agree to vote on the Hydrocarbon Law89, an action supported by the Council of 
Ministers90. Without entering into technical details, the argument between political actors 
82 See among others, polls realized in Iraq these last years. Lins de Albuquerque (Adriana), O’Hanlon (Michael E.), 
art.cit., December 2008. And also, International Crisis Group, art.cit, Middle East Report n°75, April 2008.
83 Reidar Visser, “Iraq Federalism Bill Adopted Amid Protests and Joint Shiite–Sunni Boycott”, October 2006, 
www.historiae.org.
84 There are two other projects. One supported by the Fadila party and other Bassori political actors, about the 
transformation of Basra as a federal entity. This project already entered a legal phase and a governorate petition 
should be organized in few weeks. Another project promotes the gathering of three govenorates around Basra ( “Al 
iqlim al Junub” the region of the South which contains Basra Maysan and  Dhi Qar)
85 Reidar Visser, “Suffering, Oil, and Ideals of Coexistence: Non-Sectarian Federal Trends in the Far South of Iraq”, 
Paper presented to the MESA 2007 annual meeting, Montreal, November 17–20, www.historiae.org.
86 With the notable exception of the governorate of Basra, in which the Sunni population account for maybe 15-20%
87 See below about Kurdistan and its boundaries.
88 See SIGIR, “Quarterly Report and SemiAnnual Report to the United States Congress”, January 2009 p94.  
89 Should be included in this law: The revenue sharing among private companies, governorates, and the federal 
government; restructuring of the Ministry of Oil; and regeneration of the Iraq National Oil Company.
90 For the second time the Hydrocarbons law was submitted to the Council Of Representative  but returned without 
action to the Council of Minister on October 2008. 
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concerning  the  Hydrocarbons  Law focuses  on  two  main  points.  As  discussed  earlier, 
linked  to  the  question  of  federalism  is  the  question  of  the  management  and  the 
development of the hydrocarbons fields and the resources they provide. As International 
Crisis Group puts it, “at the core of the oil dispute lie two opposing views on the role of the  
state in the economy as well as the struggle between Kurdish and Arab nationalism”91. 
Given that the hydrocarbon resources are only present in and around the Kurdistan region 
in the North, and around Basra in the South of the country, the question of who is entitled 
to monitor natural resources and their products is an extremely sensitive one. For many 
actors, the central state should be in charge of monitoring the hydrocarbon in the entire 
Iraqi  territory and redistributing the benefits of  the hydrocarbon production fairly  to the 
regions  and  governorates.  For  others,  the  federal  regions  or  governorates  where 
hydrocarbon is located must have the last word about the production, the development 
and the share of  the hydrocarbon resources. If  the main argument on this question is 
between the Kurdish regional authority and the Arab Iraqi political actors (including Prime 
Minister al Maliki92), in Basra governorate too, there are some voices calling for a special 
share of the oil93. To argue their case, both Kurds and pro-federalist political actors speak 
of the continuous history of oppression, dispossession and marginalisation of the Kurdish 
and Southern area by the central state during the last decades, but also of the “erratic 
release of agreed budgetary resources by the current government”94. 
The other source of debate is the contracts for control of the hydrocarbons field which 
would be signed between the Iraqi state or the federal entities and the international oil 
companies. Most recently particular concern has been over Production Sharing Contracts 
(PSCs),  or  Production  Sharing  Agreements.  These are  individual  contracts  negotiated 
between  an oil-producing  country  and an oil  company.  The contractor  oil  company is 
permitted to carry out all exploration, production and marketing in respect of the oil in the 
designated area, for a given period of time or until  recovery cost and agreed fees are 
earned by the contractor. These kinds of agreements are considered by political and social 
actors as very detrimental to the national interest of the oil host countries. Whilst nobody 
inside the Iraqi  government is  stating publicly  their  position on the privatization of  the 
hydrocarbon  sector95,  the  Hydrocarbons  Law  project  and  the  nature  of  the  current 
contracts  signed  between  the  Iraqi  regional  companies96 and  the  international  oil 
companies is already infuriating many political  actors and oil  specialists97.  For many of 
them and as put by  former Executive Director and Vice Chairman of Iraq National Oil 
Company  Tariq  Shafiq,  “The  oil  ministry’s  plan  to  grant  PSCs  with  International  Oil  
Companies undertaking the operator’s role, for a 20-year term and with 75% participation,  
removes  from INOC and/or  the  North  and  South  Companies  the  operator’s  role  and 
reverses a three-decade-old practice, placing operatorship back into the hands of IOCs.”98 
91 International Crisis Group, art.cit, Middle East Report n°75, April 2008.
92 Julian Borger, “Kirkuk dispute threatens to plunge Iraq into Kurdish-Arab war”, guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 28 
October 2008.
93 Reidar Visser, “Basra Crude The Great Game of Iraq’s 'Southern' Oil”, Working Paper, Norwegian Institute of 
International Affairs, NUPI No. 723 – 2007. See also AFP, “Basra vote aims to benefit from Iraq oil wealth”, 
November 2008.
94 International Crisis Group, art.cit,Middle East Report 75.
95 But in reports meant to be read abroad, Ali Baban, Iraqi Minister of planning declares: “...The oil sector and the 
electricity sector should also be privatized, in our point of view.” Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the 
United States Congress, January 2009, p10.
96 The Southern Oil Company based in Basra, The Maysan Oil Company based in Al Amarah, the North Oil Company 
based in Kirkuk.
97 Ahmed M. Jiyad, “Oil and Gas Law in Iraq- Comprehensive and Critical Assessment”
98 Tariq Shafiq, “Iraq’s Technical Support And Production Service Contracts: Pros And Cons”,Middle East Economic 
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The Kurds, the boundaries of Kurdistan and Kirkuk:
The issue of Kurdistan is still a real factor of instability in Iraq and for the whole region. 
For  decades,  Kurdish  people  fought  the  Iraqi  state  to  achieve  their  aspiration for  self 
determination. They were confronted by oppression, ’pacification’ campaigns, deportations 
and finally horrific  gas attacks that  occurred mainly during the ‘Anfal’  campaign in the 
eighties. After the Second Gulf war in 1991, the Kurds obtained a  de facto autonomous 
region mainly behind the Green Line established by the United Nations. As noted by Joost 
Hilterman, this area corresponded to the territory granted by the autonomy agreement 
signed in 1970 with the Baath regime, which was never respected99.  There, they had their 
own  administration,  the  Kurdish  Regional  Government  (KRG)100 and  were  maintaining 
100,000 Kurdish soldiers, the Pershmerga. After 2003, they succeeded in securing the 
autonomy of the Kurdistan Region101 within the new Iraqi constitution. But what  at first 
glance looks like a happy ending after decades of conflict, with further examination proves 
more elusive. Nothing has been settled and agreed, neither for the Kurds nor for the new 
Iraq State.  Again,  deeply interlocked questions need to be answered.  If  not,  fears are 
growing that the new quagmire of Iraq will  be called ’the battle of Kirkuk’ and it  might 
involve all communities in Northern Iraq102. 
 
First of all, the question of the boundaries of the Kurdistan Region should be addressed. 
For nearly 60 years, previous Iraqi regimes conducted what was called the ‘Arabisation’ 
campaign to change the ethnic balance in Northern Iraq in order to drive out support for 
the  Kurdish  aspiration  in  areas  considered  critical  by  the  power  in  Baghdad.  While 
hundreds of  thousands of  inhabitants103 from Northern Iraq were  expelled or had their 
locality razed to the ground, Arabs from the South of Iraq and civil servants from Baghdad 
were  sent  to  settle  in  and  around  Kirkuk  or  Mosul  or  even  Tal  Afar.  Following  this, 
boundaries  of  governorates  were  redrawn  in  order  to  maximize  the  effects  of  the 
Arabisation  of  Northern  Iraq.  When  the  Saddam  regime  fell  in  2003,  the  Kurdistan 
Regional Government hastily deployed thousands of Peshmerga and civil servants beyond 
the Green Line in order to  take control  of  these long claimed territories104 which were 
stretching from the border of Syria around the town of Sinjar in the North East of Iraq to the 
border with Iran in the governorate of Dyala. But good portions of these territories, heavily 
mixed with communities, remain highly disputed between the communities themselves and 
between the KRG and the Iraqi state. And they are far from being officially integrated in the 
Kurdish Region. 
A perfect example of the problem is the situation of the city of Kirkuk. Lying on 13% of the 
Survey, VOL LI n°30,July-2008  
99 Joost Hilterman, "To Protect or to Project? Iraqi Kurds and Their Future", Middle East Report, 4 June 2008.
100 The Kurdish Regional Government(KRG) whose president is Masoud Barzani.
101  The Kudish Region( KR) includes the three historical Kurdish governorates of Dohuk, Sulemanya, Erbil.
102 Mostly  Kurds, Arabs,  and Turcomans inhabitants of the areas around Kirkuk and Mossul but also other religious 
and ethnic minorities like the Assyro-Chaldeens. See Leila Fadel, “Iraq's Kurdish-Arab tensions threaten to escalate 
into war” McClatchy Newspapers, February 2009. 
103 In their majority the Kurds, but also Turcomans and even Assyro-Chaldeans were victims of the different 
“Arabisation” campaigns in the North of Iraq and especially in the region of Kirkuk since the 60's.
104 “Iraqi  Kurdistan  consists  of  the  Governorate  of  Dohuk  in  its  current  administrative  boundaries;  and,  in  its  
administrative boundaries prior to 1968, the Governorates of Kirkuk, Suleimaniya, and Erbil; the districts of Aqra,  
Sheikhan,  Sinjar,  Tel  Afar  and  Qarqoush,  and  the  sub-districts  of  Zammar,  Ba’shiqa  and  Aski  Kalak  in  the  
Governorate of Ninewa; the sub-districts of Khanaqin and Mandali in the Governorate of Diyala; and the district of  
Badra and sub-district of Jassan in the Governorate of Waset”.Quoted by the International Crisis Group, “Iraq and 
the kurds resolving the Kirkuk crisis”, Middle East Report n° 64, April 2007, p9. 
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oil  resources  of  Iraq,  the  Kirkuk  governorate  and  the  city  itself  are  historically  mixed 
between Kurds, Arab, Turcoman and Assyro-Chaldean communities. For decades it was 
claimed as ’the heart of Kurdistan’ by the two main Kurdish parties105. True, the census of 
1957, prior to the establishment of the Iraqi Republic, shows that the Kurds counted for 
49% of the inhabitants of the governorate of Kirkuk, whilst the Arabs and the Turcomans 
were respectively 28% and 21%106. But it also shows that the Turcomans predominated in 
the  city  of  Kirkuk107.  And after  decades of  ‘Arabisation’ campaigns108 in  Kirkuk  and its 
vicinity, figures were reversed and Arabs became the biggest community in Kirkuk. After 
the 2005 elections which were boycotted by most of the Arabs and Turcomans alike, the 
Kurds  secured the  control  of  the  new  council  of  both  the  town  of  Kirkuk  and  its 
governorate. Moreover, thanks to the new Iraqi constitution, they obtained the possibility to 
integrate Kirkuk in the KRG through a process of three phases109. The first phase, called 
“normalization” should entitle all the victims of deportations of the former Iraqi regimes, to 
resettle in their previous properties and encourage the Arabs, also called wafidin110, which 
were sent by the previous regime, to settle back in the South. Then, after a census to 
establish the demographics of each community, a referendum should be held in order to 
ask the inhabitants if they want to be integrated into the KRG. However, because of the 
predominance of the Kurds in the council of the town and in the normalization commission, 
Turcoman and Assyro-Chaldean communities accuse it of favouring Kurdish refugees and 
preventing the other groups from coming back to Kirkuk. Besides, lots of the wafidin who 
are not represented at all in the commission refuse to resettle. In fact, for most of the non-
Kurdish actors, any  ‘normalisation’ process  in its current form  is perceived as a tool to 
reverse  the ethnic  balance of  Kirkuk;  in  other  words, the “Kurdification”111 of  Kirkuk in 
preparation for its integration into the new Kurdistan. Thus, fearful of becoming minorities 
inside  a  Kurdish  Region,  which  might  soon  become  independent,  all  non-Kurdish 
communities refuse the implementation of the census and reject even more strongly the 
referendum on the status of Kirkuk. As a result, the process which should have ended in 
December 2007 remains at a standstill. It is fair to say that thousands of Kurds native to 
Kirkuk are still waiting, with great restraint, to get their belongings and their lost memories 
back, and that the Kurdish communities in Erbil or Suleymaniah still dream fervently of the 
return of their ‘lost capital’. But it is also a reality that thousands of non-Kurdish native to 
Kirkuk adamantly stand against any move in this direction.   
Since the Kurdish leadership is highly involved in the new Iraqi state112, lots of Iraqi political 
actors accuse the Kurds of playing a double game; whilst playing down their will to gain 
the independence for Kurdistan, the Kurdish leadership is being further integrated into the 
105 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal Talabani, now the President of the Iraqi Republic. Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP) led by Masoud Barzani. 
106 International Crisis Group, “War In Iraq: What’s Next For The Kurds?”, Middle East Report N°10, March 2003 and 
also Yücel Güçlü, “Who Owns Kirkuk? The Turkoman Case”, Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2007, pp. 79-86
107 “(...)By, 1959, they [the Kurds] had swollen to more than one-third of the population and the Turcomans had 
declined to just over half, the Assyrians and Arabs accounting, in the main for the rest of the total of 120 000.”in 
Hana Batatu, The Old Social Classes and New Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, London, al-Saqi Books, re-edition 
2004,  p942.
108 As far as 100 000 Kurds, Turcomans and Assyro-Chaldeens were deported from Kirkuk. Brooking Institutions. John 
Fawcett and Victor Tanner, “The Internally Displaced People of Iraq”, An Occasional Paper, Washington, D.C., The 
Brookings Institution. SAIS Project on Internal Displacement, October 2002, http://www.brookings.edu 
109 Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution.  
110 Also called  mustawafidin, which means the new comers in Arabic.  
111 Interview with Iraqi Intellectual in Damascus_Dec 2008.
112 The president of the Republic, the Deputy Prime minister, the Foreign Minister are Kurds with Kurdish Nationalist 
background.
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Iraqi new political system and using its strong position within it so as to expand its control 
on portions of Iraqi territories, like Kirkuk. More worryingly, the Kurdish leadership and its 
allies are accused of fuelling the sectarian violence when they pushed for the kind of 
’ethnic quota sharing’ federalist system that was established after 2003. The fear is that 
when they see fit, Kurds will  call for independence. To demonstrate this, some political 
actors  ask  why  the  Iraqi  flag  is  still  forbidden  inside  the  KRG,  as  well  as  during  a 
referendum on the independence113 which took place in the Kurdistan Region. Others also 
wonder why the KRG is already conducting negotiations and signing oil fields development 
contracts with International Oil Companies, which would imply that the oil around Kirkuk 
already belongs to the Kurdish Region114? All these concerns and fears can be summed 
up by what one Iraqi intellectual said: “It is true that the Kurds suffered a lot from the last  
regimes. So if they want to take their independence, they should take it. But in this case,  
what is Jalal Talabani, who fought Iraq for more than thirty years, doing as President of the  
Iraqi Republic? And why all this fight for Kirkuk? It was always mixed since hundred years  
ago. So why not let it like that? Why willing to make it Kurd only? The Kurds need Kirkuk  
and its oil only if they want to get their independence. But, they should understand that if  
they take their independence, they will never take Kirkuk with them. Never.”115              
Finally, there is a need for a reconciliation process between the Kurds and the Iraqi state 
after the trauma of the past few decades. This process must lead to a true and sincere 
recognition of the oppressions and atrocities inflicted on the Kurds by the previous Iraqi 
regimes. Above all, trust must be nurtured between all communities and political actors. An 
understandable distrust and defiance against the Iraqi state remains among the Kurds, 
who fear to live the same events as the Anfal campaign again. And after their suffering, no 
one can deny their legitimate quest for a secure and viable entity based on the territories 
historically inhabited by the Kurds. But at the same time, this cannot be achieved at the 
expense of the non-Kurdish communities inhabiting the disputed territories. It cannot be 
achieved  either  if  the  Kurdish  aspiration  appears  to  most  Iraqi  political  actors  as 
undermining, or contradictory to, the reconstruction of a viable Iraqi state. 
National Reconciliation: 
The different political actors as well as the Iraqi society itself need to find a way towards 
national reconciliation in order to rebuild a normalized public space in which debates and 
political arguments will not be settled through violence but compromise. This reconciliation 
must allow the society to cure itself of the wounds it suffered in the last thirty years, due 
not only to the Saddam regime, but also to the embargo imposed by the international 
community and then by the invasion of Iraq by the US-led coalition, and finally by the 
sectarian  civil  war.  As  with  reconciliation  processes  that  have  taken  place  in  other 
countries, the victims’ voices have to be heard, and all responsibilities and crimes have to 
be revealed. But there has to be a compromise between the need to reveal the crimes of 
these last years and the necessity to preserve the possibility of a rebuilding of the Iraqi 
state as well as the inclusion of all political actors in the public sphere. 
From this  point  of  view the DeBaathification  campaign launched by the CPA and the 
113 A Non official petition, but with material help of the KRG, on the issue of  independence was done in the three 
governorates of Kurdistan and abroad in 2004.  
114 Interviews conducted in Damas with member of the INFC, Hayat Hulama and independents in 2007-2008.  
115 Interview done with an Iraqi intellectual in London. December 2007.
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Interim Government was a typical example of a counter-productive policy. It was a huge 
mistake because it sent back home a huge number of civil servants who were vital for the 
reconstruction of the State116 and also closed the door of the public space to many political 
actors;  and finally,  because  it  was  perceived  as  an  ’anti  Sunni  tool’,  it  increased the 
sectarian tensions117.  The Supreme National Commission for Accountability and Justice 
Law which was passed on January 2008 was supposed to correct the side effects of the 
’DeBaathification’. Unfortunately, it did not really address the problems described above118. 
In fact, in order to be effective, national reconciliation can not be led through an ideological 
or partisan stance. 
116 International Crisis Group, art.cit, Middle East Report n°75, April 2008.
117 Hazem Saghieh, «The Life and Death of De-Baathification»,  Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée, 
N° 117-118 - L'Irak en perspective, Juillet 2007.  
118 Miranda Sissons,  “Briefing Paper: Iraq’s New 'Accountability and Justice' Law”, International Center for 
Transitional Justice,New York,January 2008.
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4) The actors of the conflict:
Since the overthrow of the Saddam regime and the occupation of  Iraq by the US-led 
coalition, hundreds of political organisations, gatherings and fronts appeared on the public 
scene. Six years later, some of them have dissolved, others merged, but few remain as 
they emerged 6 years  ago.  We will  not  try  to  make an exhaustive list  of  all  of  these 
organisations, but rather to focus on the main actors of the Iraqi crisis. Also, in trying to 
understand the Iraqi situation, one should acknowledge that in six years the Iraqi political 
scene saw a lot  of  reshuffled alliances and political  fronts according to power  sharing 
priorities, foreign alliances and military evolution on the ground. But for the first time, the 
military situation on the ground and the political scene seem to evolve toward the same 
direction which is the consolidation of the State, a more inclusive political process and the 
rejection of the Federalisation of the State, seen as a sectarian ’Pandora’s Box’.  Three 
factors can explain this new situation. One is the Security Agreement, as ambiguous as it 
is, which officially announces a withdrawal timetable of the US troops which has definitely 
helped the Iraqi government and especially its Prime Minister Al Maliki regain legitimacy 
and credibility. .The second is the inclusion in the political process of parts, if not all, of the 
previous armed groups inside the Sahwa and their participation in the provincial elections. 
The third  is  the  relative  mistrust  toward the  organisations  which  were  involved  in  the 
sectarian war,  such as the Al Sadr movement or the Islamic Supreme Council  of Iraq 
(ISCI).  The provincial  elections  of  the  2009,  in  which  the lists  which  focused on Iraqi 
nationalism and a strong and centralized State, rather than on federalism sectarianism or 
religion, appeared to have won. Now as usual after each election in Iraq, the big business 
of power-sharing in the councils between every organisation and political personality has 
begun, and as the professor Reidar Visser underlines it: “One of the biggest questions 
now  is  whether  there  will  be  moves  towards  ideological  or  opportunistic  alliances.  
(...)Recently, the secular Iyad Allawi has apparently been in dialogue with ISCI (and the  
heavily-decimated Fadila party has hinted at the possible reconstitution of the (Shiite-led)  
United Iraqi Alliance. These are both examples of moves that would negate the declared 
aim of these parties to move away from a political system of ethno-sectarian quota-sharing  
(...)”119. And unfortunately, the record of this last 6 years does not play so much in favour of 
all of these political organisations and personalities.    
Political Movements:  
The government coalition:
In  2005,  two  lists  won  the  general  elections  and  were  the  key  brokers  of  the  Iraqi 
government. The United Iraqi Alliance, which was the gathering of the main Shiites parties 
(ISCI, Da'wa, al Sadr, al Fadhila) and the Kurdish alliance which was the gathering of the 
two main Kurdish parties and other smaller formations (KDP, PUK, and some Assyrian 
and Christian groups). At that time, because of the ethnic quota sharing system, some 
Sunni parties like the IIP and the Iraqi accord front, entered the government. Since then, 
this loose coalition of vested and partisan interests has split several times. Also, lots of 
organisations are no longer part of the government coalition, while others joined later.     
_Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, ISCI, (formerly known as the Supreme Council for the 
Islamic  Revolution  in  Iraq,  SCIRI):  Led  by  Sayyid  Abdul  Aziz  al-Hakim.  It  was  long 
119 Reidar Visser, “The Provincial Elections: The Seat Allocation Is Official and the Coalition-Forming Process 
Begins”,19 February 2009, www.historiae.org. 
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considered as the biggest Shiite party, with the al Sadr movement. After the provincial and 
general elections of 2005, it received the majority in most of the governorate councils in 
the 9 governorates of  the South and one of the biggest numbers of  seats in the Iraqi 
national  assembly.  Today,  it  seems that  the  party  has  lost  much of  its  influence and 
support among the Shiite community since 2005. This may be due firstly to its failure to 
adequately clear itself of the accusations that it is an Iran proxy or an Iran-oriented party. 
Secondly, its management of the governorate and some ministries  also appear to have 
been a huge failure120. Finally,  its sectarian stance and practices and its long sectarian 
campaign for  an autonomous Shiite  region was opposed by a large number of  Iraqis, 
including the Shiite Iraqis.         
  
_The Iraqi  Islamic  Party:  led  by Tariq  al-Hashimi,  who  is  also  one of  the  two  Vice-
Presidents of Iraq. Established in the sixties, this Sunni Islamic party, close to the Muslim 
Brotherhood121, spent most of the thirty years of the Baathist regime underground. After 
2003, it entered the political process created by the US-led coalition, claiming to defend 
the  Sunni  Arab  community  from  “isolation”  and  “suppression”122.  In  the  elections  of 
December 2005, it was the main body of a loose Islamist Sunni coalition named the Iraqi 
Consensus Front. As virtually the sole Sunni participant it did well in the general elections 
of 2005 despite or because of the huge boycott of most of the Sunni community. Since 
then the party has been accused of having failed both in representing the interests of the 
Sunni community and in managing the governorate of al Anbar. Finally, they are accused 
of having backed the federalisation of  the State and its “ethno-sectarian quota sharing 
system123”  and  in  some ways  benefiting  from it.  However,  its  results  in  the  provincial 
elections in 2008 were better than expected and especially in the al Anbar governorate. 
This  has meant  that  somehow the party has kept  considerable influence in the Sunni 
community and notably in the province of al Anbar.       
 
_The Kurdish Alliance,  (Kurdish Democratic  Party,  Patriotic  Union of  Kurdistan): 
Since the US invasion, the two Kurdish parties have succeeded in securing and promoting 
the Kurdish agenda inside the new Iraqi constitution and in the general elections of 2005. 
Thus, they obtained the position of President of the Iraqi Republic as well as the positions 
of  foreign minister,  deputy prime minister  and deputy army chief  of  staff.  They mainly 
focused on the control of the so-called contested territories and in particular the city of 
Kirkuk, and, in alliance with the ISCI, they tried to promote their conception of a loose and 
Ethno-sectarian based federalism. Today, it seems that they are slightly loosing their grip 
on Kirkuk and the territories. But they are likely to face an even bigger challenge: the 
reversal of fortune of the federalist idea in Iraq, and the weakening of federalist parties like 
ISCI  that  may  follow,  and  also  the  new  commitments  of  Prime  Minister  al  Maliki  to 
reinforce and re-centralize the State.          
_Al Da'wa Party: led by Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki. Established in the fifties, the Da'wa 
reappeared on the political  scene after the 2003 invasion as the older and one of the 
weakest of the Shiite parties. As a part of the Shiite coalition in the general elections of 
2005, it participated in the founding of the Iraqi government and because or in spite of its 
120 Patrick Cockburn, « Corruption blamed as cholera rips through Iraq » The Idependent, Friday, 10 October 2008 and 
Joost R Hiltermann, "Iraq’s elections: winners, losers, and what’s next », Open Democraty, 10-02-09, 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/iraq-s-elections-winners-losers-and-what-s-next 
121 Erik Rendek, “Entretien avec Muhammad Ahmad Al-Rasheed, consultant auprès du Parti Islamique Irakien”, May 
2004, www.oumma.com. 
122 Ahmed Janabi, “Interview of Tarek al Hashimi”, Aljazeera.net, October 2005, www.Aljazeera.net.
123 Reidar Visser, art.cit, 8 February 2009.
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weakness, the party received the post of Prime Minister. After the fall of Prime Minister al 
Jafari in 2006 and an intense bargaining between the ISCI, the Sadr movement, the Da'wa 
and the US administration, Nouri al Maliki was chosen as the lower common denominator. 
Since then, Maliki has proved to be much more resilient than originally thought. Though he 
started his mandate as the weak Prime Minister of a government clearly lacking legitimacy, 
he managed to bolster his position at the head of the Iraqi state, and the position of his 
party in the Iraqi political scene. For two years, he has been credited for having crushed 
Shiites militias in the South and Baghdad124. Then, he used this campaign against militias 
to weaken his two Shiite rivals, the ISCI and Al Sadr movement. He also strongly opposed 
the Kurdish stance on Kirkuk and on the management of oil fields in the North. Then, he 
made strong declarations about the Iraqi state and against Federalism. Finally, all of this 
and the announcement of the withdrawal of the US troops scheduled for 2011 enabled him 
to raise his credibility as a potent Iraqi nationalist leader. The impressive results of his list 
in the provincial elections of 2008125  and his recent apparent moves towards working with 
the ’22t July block’126 of the parliamentary opposition could entrench him in this position127. 
The Opposition:
_Al  Sadr  Movement  or  Al  Sadr  II  movement: led  by Moktada  al  Sadr  since  2003. 
Inheriting  the  huge  popularity  and  the  massive  bases  of  the  movement  founded  by 
Moktada's father,  Sayyed  Muhammed Muhammed Seddiq al  Sadr128,  the movement al 
Sadr II  enjoyed the biggest  popularity  among the young and the impoverished Shiite 
population129 in Baghdad and in the south of Iraq. But it seems that this Islamic movement 
has lost ground in the Shiite community. First, the Al Sadr movement suffered two military 
defeats against  the US in 2004 and 2005, with  a good number of  its  cadres killed or 
arrested. Secondly, it paid for the terrible behaviour of its undisciplined militia, the Madhi 
Army (al Jeish el Madhi). Even if  the direction of the Al Sadr movement and Moktada 
himself condemned the sectarian cleaning and sectarian acts of terror, and also dismissed 
armed groups who were claiming to be Jeish el Madhi130, a vast majority of Iraqis accuse 
the Madhi army of being one of the main actors in the sectarian civil war and of the horrors 
which took place131. In addition, the political strategy of the movement never really stopped 
124 In fact, the US troops were obliged to intervene and save Maliki from a disastrous military campaign notably in 
Basra.
125 His list, “the state of law” took the lead in 8 of the South governorates and in Baghdad. In the Northern governorate 
of  Ninewa, the Al Habda list which has the support of Maliki also obtained the majority of seats. See Independent 
Hight Electoral Commission (IHEC), Preliminary Result, Unami Unofficial Translation, 05/02/2009. 
126 On the 22nd  July 2008, a cross sectarian and cross partisan gathering of  Iraqi parliament members voted a new 
provincial electoral law which banned the use of religious symbols during the elections and challenged the control 
of the Kurdish parties on Kirkuk. Even if the law was vetoed by the presidential council, this gathering took the 
name of the “22 July block”, (Tajammu al-Thani wa al-Ishrin min Tammuz), and is considered as an oppositional, 
nationalist and anti sectarian parliamentary block.  
127 “(...)a more profound overhaul of the Iraqi political system is needed, with institutional checks against the quota-
sharing system that a large group of Iraqi parliamentarians are now rebelling against(...)Hence, only when Maliki  
moves in the direction of constitutional revision will his flirtation with the 22 July parties and his conversion to  
Iraqi nationalism become truly convincing(...).” Reidar Visser, art.cit, 8 February 2009, www.historiae.org.
128 Most probably assassinated by the Baathist regime in 99. See Faleh A.Jabar, op.cit, 2003.
129 See Faleh A.Jabar, op.cit, 2003 and also Juan Cole, “The United States and Shi‘ite Religious Factions in Post-
Ba‘thist Iraq”,Middle East Journal, August 2003.  
130 “This days, anyone can wear a black shirt and shout Moktada while he is doing horrible things. Like what happened  
in some area of Baghdad, in Khazamia or Shula. But we don't recognize this people and they don't obey us. They  
are gangster! That's it.” Interview Sayyed Hassan al Moussawi, Ulema Shiite, member of Al Sadr movement, 
Damascus 2007.  
131 “(...)They are the Talibans of Iraq, they did terrible things against everyone, Shiites, Sunnites, everyone(...)”, “They 
called themselves Jeish el Mehdi, but they are just a bunch of thugs(...).” There is numerous testimonies from Iraqi 
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oscillating between an all-out fight  against the US troops and a very broad nationalist 
rhetoric involving sectarian alliances and gestures. In this way, the Sadrist participated in 
the 2005 election and in the government which resulted from it, although Moktada himself 
has refused to participate in elections132. In 2008, after two and a half years of participation 
in  the government of  Maliki,  the two Sadrist  ministers resigned and the parliamentary 
members  of  the  movement  joined  the  opposition.  This  unclear,  or  at  the  very  least 
acrimonious, strategy did not help give the movement the credibility needed to overcome 
the  sentiment  that,  above  all,  it  was  a  gathering  of  restless  youngsters  without  real 
leadership133. Nowadays, the parliamentary members of the movement are part of the ’the 
22nd  July Block’, an unofficial and cross-sectarian gathering which is rising up against the 
decentralized  and  ethno-sectarian  federalist  constitution  of  the  State.  The  al  Sadr 
movement  did  not  present  it  own  list  in  the  last  provincial  elections,  but  backed 
independent lists.           
 
_al Fadhila:   led by the Shiite cleric Mohammed al Yakoubi. Al Fadhila is a breakaway 
faction of the Al Sadr movement. Al Yakoubi was a top aid cleric of Ayatollah Muhammed 
Muhammed Sediq al Sadr. When Moktada took the lead of the Sadrist movement in 2003, 
al Yakoubi refused to accept it. He founded al Fadhila party with other Sadrists. In 2005, Al 
Fadhila  was  part  of  the  United  Iraqi  Alliance  and  obtained  some  seats  in  the  Iraqi 
Assembly, but joined the opposition a few months later. It is also part of the ’22 July Block’. 
This Islamic party established his stronghold in the south of Iraq and notably in Basra 
where  it  led  the  governorate  council.  While  supporting  a  centralized  government  and 
holding an anti-sectarian stance, it also campaigned for a quasi autonomy for Basra. But 
the last provincial elections turned out to be quite disastrous for the party, which lost the 
governorate of Basra and won few seats in only two more provinces in the South. 
_Al Wifaq  or Iraqi National Accord Movement (INAM): Secular gathering led By Iyad 
Allawi. Allawi is the former Prime Minister of the Transitional government of 2004. Despite 
massive help from the US administration, Al Wifaq lost the 2005 elections and secured 
only a few seats in the National Assembly. Since then, the Wifaq joined the opposition and 
is  part  of  the  informal  ’22  July  Block’.  The  party  has  also  developed  ties  with  other 
secularist organisations such as the Iraqi Communist Party and the Iraqi National Front led 
by Saleh al Mutlaq. 
Outside of the Political Process:
 
_The Iraqi National Foundation Congress led by Sheikh Jawad Madhi al Khalissy. For 
years, the INFC served as a loose gathering and meeting space between, personalities, 
political organisations, guerrillas and armed groups which all either completely refused the 
political process and the US led-occupation or openly criticised it. 
 
refugees, Damas Nov 2006_Dec 2008.
132 « [Moktada Al Sadr] : I personally will stay away from the elections until the occupiers stay away from them, and 
until our beloved Sunnis participate in them,… otherwise they will lack legitimacy and democracy."quoted by 
Anthony Shadid,  Washington Post Foreign Service, Monday, January 24, 2005.
133 “(...)Al Sadr movement(...), they don't have a strategy, they are opportunist(...)They are jumping from one rope to  
another rope. Yesterday they said: 'we are with the movement of Sheikh Khalissy and we are Arabs against the 
occupation', today they say: 'we are with the Dawa Party' and after they go and kiss the hands of Sistani', tomorrow 
they will ask Al Hakim: 'We are Shiites like you, so tell us what should we do?'(...)”Interview with   Iraqi Journalist 
and Intellectual in Damascus. March, 2007. 
28
_Al  Hayat al Ulema (Muslim Scholars Association) led by Sheikh Harith Al-Dhari.  The 
Muslim Scholars  Association  was  established directly  after  2003 and enjoyed  a  huge 
popularity among the Sunni community and Sunni armed groups, especially with the 1920 
Revolution  Brigades.  Until  now  the  MSA had  always  refused  any  participation  in  the 
political process. 
But after the years of civil war (during which both leaders have been forced to leave the 
country and take refuge in Syria and Jordan) and also, because of the recent political 
developments, they appear to have lost some of the influence they enjoyed among political 
organisations and Iraqis in general.
Armed Movement or Militia:
 
_The Badr brigade: Militia of the ISCI founded by the party in Iran in the eighties. Claimed 
to be disbanded by the ISCI. It is accused of having infiltrated many security apparatus, 
especially those of the Ministry of the Interior, where it formed death squads responsible 
for sectarian and political  kidnapping and assassinations. It is also accused of sectarian 
cleansing.
_The Madhi Army (Jeish el Madhi): Militia of the al Sadr movement, founded in 2003. 
The militia was essentially a loose gathering of youngsters and inexperienced fighters. The 
militia  is  widely  accused  of  being  involved  in  the  sectarian  cleansing,  especially  in 
Baghdad. The majority of the militia was officially disbanded by the Al Sadr movement and 
the  forces  which  remained  and  still  claimed  they  belonged  to  the  Madhi  army  were 
crushed by the Iraqi government and US forces in 2008.    
_The  Peshmerga:  ’Peshmerga’  is  the  name of  the  fighters  of  the  militias  of  the  two 
Kurdish parties. Now, the Pershmerga are the official security apparatus of the Kurdish 
Regional Government.
_The Sahwa: (Sahwa,  Local Concerned Citizen,  sons of Iraq), As mentioned above, the 
Sahwa movement is a loose gathering of mostly Sunni tribal fighters under the command 
of tribal sheikhs. Well-known Sunni armed groups such as the 1920 Revolution Brigades, 
part of the Islamic Army, and part of the secular nationalist groups integrated the Sahwa. 
At the beginning, the Sahwa had three main goals:  crushing of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, 
being a counterweight to the Shiite militias and influencing the political balance in favour of 
the Sunni community. Today, most of the Sahwa members are waiting for their integration 
into the Iraqi security apparatus. Also the heads of the movement, mainly sheikhs, enlisted 
in politics and ran in the provincial elections of 2009. In al Anbar province, the list led by 
the Sheikh Ahmed abu Risha, leader of the Sahwa in the governorate, ranked second just 
below the list backed by the Iraqi Islamist Party134.
_Al Qaeda In Mesopotamia (AQM): After making enemies of virtually all the communities 
of  Iraq,  AQM  is  in  an  all  out  fight  against  the  Sahwa,  the  Shiite  militias,  the  Iraqi 
government  and  the  US  troops  since  2007.  It  now  appears  to  have  been  largely 
weakened, but it is difficult to judge whether such an organization will ultimately survive or 
die. .   
134 See Independent Hight Electoral Commission (IHEC), Preliminary Result, Unami Unofficial Translation, 
05/02/2009. 
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Of course, other small armed groups or disenfranchised factions remain, but they appear 
not to have the same capacity or at least the same space in the Iraqi society as a few 
years  ago. This and the fact  that most of  the biggest militias integrated into the state 
apparatus or  have been disbanded,  does not  mean an end to  violence,  but  merely  a 
reduction of it. And the situation still remains precarious.
International Actors: 
Since the beginning of the conflict Iraq has been and is still  the target of many foreign 
interventions which have interest in this country. As with other conflicts and civil wars, like 
in Lebanon or the former Yugoslavia, foreign interventions, overt or covert,  have rarely 
solved anything. Mostly, foreign interventions tend to aggravate the divisions and the use 
of violence between the local actors and, by developing proxies, multiply these actors135. 
Iraq did not avoid this fate and political organisations, militias and armed groups have all 
received the assistance of foreign ’friends’. Syria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and of course 
the US are the most active in Iraq. 
_Syria: This country is stuck between its biggest enemy (US) and its biggest friend (Iran). 
That means that the involvement of Syria in Iraq is always on the edge, in a manner that 
will  not completely infuriate the US and not embarrass Iran. Of course, Syria and Iran 
agree on the necessity to prevent a long establishment of the USA in Iraq. The problem is 
the shape of the future Iraq. Because of ideological reasons (Arab nationalism is one of 
the  main  pillars  of  the  Syrian  regime)  and  sociological  reasons  (around  65%  of  the 
population is Arab Sunni, and the remaining  35% are divided between Christians, Allawi, 
Druze, Kurds and Shiites) the Syrian regime is clearly opposed to the idea of a religious 
Shiite-led Iraq, or to a loose sectarian federation. The regime fears, with good reason, that 
the outcome of such a new Iraq will  have real destabilizing effects on its own country. 
However,  Syria  remains  influential  among secular  organisations,  ex-Baathists,  a  lot  of 
Sunni tribes and some Sunni armed groups. Also, because it has generously welcomed 
around one million Iraqis who fled the civil war, Syria now holds considerable sway in the 
international resolution of the crisis.     
_Jordan & Saudi Arabia: The main concerns of the two countries are the development of 
Iran as a regional super power and related to it, the rising of a so-called ’Shiite crescent’. 
What  is  more,  in  Saudi  Arabia  the  Wahhabi  regime  fears  that  the  Iraqi  Shiite  led-
government could be seen as an example by the vast Saudi Shiite minority who live under 
pressure and discrimination. Mainly, the two countries are influential among Sunni clergy, 
the Iraqi Islamic Party and some Sunni armed groups. Of course, because of their alliance 
with the USA, they cannot openly criticise the political process initiated in Iraq by the US-
led occupation and which resulted in the victory of the Shiites organisations in 2005.But as 
Jordan also has hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees in its territory, it will have some 
role to play in the resolution of the crisis.  
 
_Turkey: Turkey is perhaps the country on which the future of the Iraqi crisis will have the 
most impact in terms of foreign policy. Historically, one of the closest allies of the US in the 
135 “(...)Each time that a faction or a militia receives some money or weapons because it belongs to a broader alliance 
or directly from a foreign country, it will use it in order to increase its power against the other factions. On the 
other side, the neighboring country have to support groups or   militias if they want to conserve some influence on 
Iraq”.Interview with a member of the Iraqi National Foundation Congress, Damascus, March 2007.
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region (just after Israel), the soft but firm Turkish rejection of the invasion of Iraq was a 
milestone in relations between the two countries. Since then, Turkey and the United States 
have tried to recover the level of cooperation and relations that they used to enjoy but with 
limited success. For Turkey, aside from ethical concerns136, the invasion of Iraq meant that 
the Iraqi/Kurd problem which had been somewhat frozen since 1991 could resurface on its 
border. This would bolster Kurdish community, organisations and armed groups (like PKK) 
from Turkey. In addition, the general empowerment of the Kurdish Regional Government, 
the federalisation of Iraq and finally the de facto control of Kirkuk by the KRG, even if not 
recognized by the other Iraqi actors, has pushed Turkey to act in three directions. It has 
developed stronger diplomatic ties especially with  Syria and Iran in the region137. It also 
intervened militarily in the Kurdistan province of Iraq. And in Iraq, Turkey first backed the 
important  Turcoman  community  and  notably  the  Iraqi  Turcoman  Front,  but  it  also 
developed links with Arab nationalist personalities and secular or Islamic organisations, 
such as the Iraqi National Accord Front. 
_Iran: Iran has two widely  acknowledged concerns regarding Iraq.  The first  one is  to 
prevent Iraq from becoming a threat against Iran again. For good reason: Iranians (and 
Iraqis as well) still remember the eight years of terrible war they fought against Iraq which 
at that time was backed by the West. More broadly, they want to prevent a government 
which would be a threat against the Shiite community and especially the Shiite clergy. The 
second concern is the large and powerful presence of the US in Iraq. Given the hostility 
between the US and Iran, Iran cannot let Iraq fall completely under the US influence and 
become an US proxy, or worse, let Iraq be a base for the next US attack on Iran. With this 
in mind, there is not one Iranian strategy but many aimed at resolving these issues, at 
least three of which we can summarise here. First is the support of the establishment of a 
friendly  Shiite-led  government  of  a  united  Iraq  which  will  gradually  extricate  the  US 
influence. Second is the support of a very loose Iraqi federation on sectarian bases, which 
means that a south Iraqi autonomous region (even as far as Baghdad) will be under the 
complete influence of Iran. The last is, as one Iraqi respondent puts it, “the creation of a 
small hell for US in Iraq to keep them busy,  [so they will not be able to attack Iran].”138. 
These strategies are not antagonistic, but more like cards which are played in regard to 
the evolution of the situation and with different partners and factions. Thus, because of 
historical  and ideological reasons or sectarian proximities, Iran is particularly influential 
among the ISCI and the Badr Brigades, with some factions of the D'awa party, with other 
smaller Shiites organisations like the Iraqi Hezbollah and to a lesser extent with some 
factions  inside  the  al  Sadr  movement  and possibly  some Sunni  armed groups139.  For 
obvious reasons it is quite difficult to determine how this influence in each organisation is 
translated in terms of money, weapons, military trainings etc, but it seems that all levels of 
support were granted. In this regard, as with other influential foreign countries, Iran bears a 
responsibility  in the sectarian war  which  happened during the years  2005-2007.  But  it 
should be emphasized that if Iran was accused by many, especially Iraqi actors and US 
administration alike140 of being widely involved in the destabilisation of Iraq and the political 
136 After all, the President Ahmet Necdet Sezer of Turkey declared the war “illegitimate” and “unjustifiable”in 2003.  
137 see for example Robert Tait, "Iran sought Turkey's help to mend links with US, says Erdogan" , guardian.co.uk, 
Tuesday 24 February 2009,http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/feb/24/turkey-iran-erdogan-interview 
138 Interview with nationalist Shiite cleric, Ayatollah Ahmed al Husseini Al Baghdadi, Damascus, March 2007.  
139 Also since the Iran-Iraq war, Iran had excellent relations with the Kurdish Democratic Party. See Pierre Jean 
Luizard, La question irakienne, Fayards: Paris, 2002. and Habib Ishow , structures sociales et politiques de l'Irak 
contemporain, pourquoi un Etat en crise ? , l'Harmattan: Paris, 2003.
140 Dlovan Brwari, “Iraq Says It Has Proof Of Iranian Meddling,Tehran Funneling Weapons, Officials Say”, 
Washington Post, 5 May 2008.
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process, in the final analysis there is little evidence to suggest that Iran was by itself the 
prime spoiler in the Iraqi chaos141. 
_US:  A lot  has already been said about the US. But it  should be emphasised that its 
strategy,  if there is one142, is still  very obscure. It  is difficult to understand if the virtual 
destruction  of  Iraq  as  a  State  and  as  a  Nation  was  only  a  mistake  or  if  there  were 
ideological  aims.  The  same  is  true  about  the  development  of  the  sectarian-based 
federation. Today, it seems that the US is slightly backing the idea of a united somehow 
centralized Iraq and the inclusion into the political process of the Sunni and nationalist 
actors. But who really knows if it is just a limited trend to provide a counterweight to the 
Iranian influence or a real and tentative step to help rebuild and stabilize the Iraqi State. 
Finally, the US government accepted with great difficulties a timetable withdrawal of his 
troops in 2011. But there is still  a real ambiguity about the meaning of the withdrawal: 
Does that mean the complete return of its sovereignty to Iraq, or the continuation of the US 
influence and its control by other means?  The time has come for the US  realise  that all 
the roads which can be taken to solve the Iraqi crisis meet at the same point - a complete 
withdrawal and return of Iraqi sovereignty. 
141 “(...)the evidence of attempted destabilising Iranian intervention is far less extensive and clear than is alleged; the 
evidence of successful destabilising intervention less extensive and clear still.” in International Crisis Group, “Iran 
In Iraq : How Much Influence ?”, Middle East Report n°30, March 2005. 
142 “The first priority of United States policy now is to become more realistic about the situation inside Iraq. (…) 
During the election campaign, Barack Obama and John McCain alike gave no public sign that they understood the 
evolving situation, and in particular the degree to which political and military developments inside Iraq had an 
autonomous existence - and were not simply a resultant of US policy and shifting priorities.” Fred Halliday, “The 
Future of Iraq”, 04 December 2009, www.opendemocracy.net. 
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